penalty process themselves. 5 In this article, I argue that state legislatures, acting completely out of self-interest, could create a more fair and efficient death penalty system by requiring local county prosecutors, who handle most capital cases, to post a cash bond in order to seek the death penalty. In turn, legislatures could force counties to forfeit that bond if the capital prosecution is unsuccessful at trial or on appeal.
Allow me to take a step back to set the stage. Most death penalty cases are prosecuted at the county level, and there are great disparities between the counties. For example, while Texas is well known as the most frequent user of the death penalty, 6 capital cases are not initiated by the Texas Attorney General's office but instead by a handful of Texas's 254 counties.
7 While a majority of Texas counties have not sought a single death sentence during the last three decades, 8 Harris County-which includes the City of Houston-consistently has sought the death penalty more than a dozen times per year. 9 Similarly, a disproportionate number of capital prosecutions in the State of Pennsylvania are instigated by the Philadelphia County District Attorney; 10 most Illinois By seeking the death penalty often, a handful of counties send a disproportionate number of defendants to death row. Moreover, as Professor James Liebman and his colleagues have found, those jurisdictions that use the death penalty more frequently tend to make more mistakes, thus leading to more appellate reversals. 13 Given that counties have wide latitude to seek the death penalty (and sometimes use that latitude in marginal, or even inappropriate, cases), any solution to the arbitrariness problem must create an incentive for counties to choose their death penalty cases more carefully and more sparingly. State legislatures can create that incentive by requiring local county prosecutors to post a cash bond and transmit the money to the state treasury before filing capital charges.
14 If the county prosecutors were successful in procuring a death sentence and preserving that sentence on appeal, then the bond would be returned to the county with interest. Thus, the county would suffer no penalty 15 for seeking the death penalty in truly heinous cases; those in which it was obvious that a jury would return a death sentence, and in which the prosecutors did not have to push the envelope and risk an appellate reversal in order to win a conviction. By contrast, if county prosecutors chose marginal cases in which juries refused to sentence the defendant to death, or if prosecutors had to pull out all of the stops to procure death sentences, leading to reversals on appeal, then the county 349-50 (2002) , available at http://www2.law.columbia.edu/brokensystem21 ("[T]he more death verdicts per homicides a county imposes, the higher its capital-error rates are likely to rise .... Jurisdictions that reserve the death penalty for only the very worst offenses do the best job of avoiding serious, capital error and the risks and costs that go with it.").
JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM, PART II: WHY THERE IS SO MUCH ERROR IN CAPITAL CASES, AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT,
14. The bond could reflect the significant amount of money the state-as opposed to the county government-normally shoulders in handling appeals of death sentences. See infra notes 118-22 and accompanying text.
15. Of course, the county would lose the ability to immediately use the bond money while the case is pending on appeal. UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:861 would forfeit the bond to the state. Facing the obligation to post a large sum of money ex ante, and the possibility of never having that money returned, county prosecutors would have an incentive to seek the death penalty in only the worst of the worst cases, and an incentive to try those cases in a manner that gives every benefit of the doubt to the defendant so that the death sentence will stand up on appeal. 16 Requiring counties to post a bond would be a simple, yet stark, change from the current death penalty framework in most states. Currently, in most jurisdictions, counties initially fund the hefty costs of capital prosecutions, but they pass responsibility (and the bill) to state governments to handle most or even all of the very costly appellate and habeas corpus petitions 17 that capital petitioners file for years after trial. 18 Thus, under the current system, when counties choose their capital cases poorly, they are not forced to internalize the substantial post-trial costs associated with their errors. 19 Instead, the states are forced to foot a large part of the bill. 16 . Many counties currently spend large sums of money on capital prosecutions and appear not to be concerned about the reversals. See Robert M. Bohm The virtue of the bond proposal is that it leaves discretion in the hands of local prosecutors to determine which capital cases they want to pursue while forcing them to take full responsibility for those decisions. By requiring counties to post (and risk forfeiting) a bond commensurate with the states' costs, state legislatures would be telling the counties to:
Go ahead and seek the death penalty as often as you like. If you are successful the state will cover the expensive appellate and postconviction costs. But if you are unsuccessful, then you will forfeit a cash bond to compensate the state for the expenses it paid with respect to your failed capital prosecutions.
Obviously, counties that make frequent use of the death penalty would lobby against any such proposal. Yet, the proposal should be appealing to state legislators on at least two levels. First, many legislators care about the racial, economic, and geographic arbitrariness of the death penalty and would welcome legislation that has a chance of curbing those unfortunate realities. 20 Second, and perhaps more significant in times of tight budgets, legislators frequently seek ways to find money that could be used for other projects. If the legislature were to set the cash bond for capital cases at $300,000, and if the bond were forfeited in ten cases per year, then the state would have·an additional $3 million to spend on education, healthcare, or other projects. Thus, legislatures would be saving money for their states by charging counties for failed capital appeals, while at the same time remaining tough on crime by paying for the costs of successful capital appeals.
Part I of this article briefly reviews the Supreme Court's failed efforts to eliminate the arbitrary use of the death penalty. Part I also discusses how certain counties seek the death penalty dramatically more often than comparable jurisdictions and "overproduce" death by procuring many death sentences that are reversed on appeal and never result in executions. 21 Because states typi- cally handle the expensive appellate and postconviction petitions, these counties never fully internalize the costs of their failed death penalty prosecutions. Part II proposes that legislatures require counties to post a cash bond before seeking the death penalty, and that the bond be forfeited if a county's efforts to procure an execution fail. Part II additionally suggests two possible statutes that legislatures could adopt to implement the proposal-one that provides for total forfeiture of the bond in all failed prosecutions, and one that graduates the forfeiture amount depending on the stage in which the capital prosecution failed. Part III then discusses the incentives legislatures would have to enact this proposal. In particular, Part III discusses the high costs states pay for capital appeals. Part III also explains that, despite the need to be "tough on crime," legislatures have been reducing corrections funding in recent years to ensure that other government priorities are funded. Legislators who realize how much money failed county death penalty prosecutions are costing state taxpayers would have an incentive to put the onus on county prosecutors to assume the financial risks associated with their capital prosecutions.
I. STILL ARBITRARY AFTER ALL THESE YEARS

A. The Court's Efforts to Regulate the Death Penalty
The modern era of death penalty jurisprudence began in 1976 when the Supreme Court reinstated capital punishment. In Gregg v. Georgia, 22 the Supreme Court indicated that states could create a constitutional death penalty framework by providing "for a bifurcated proceeding at which the sentencing authority is apprised of the information relevant to the imposition of sentence and provided with standards to guide its use of the information."
23 In that connection, the Court has required that defendants be permitted to introduce any evidence that mitigates against a death sentence, even if such evidence is not contemplated by the govdo after being sentenced to die is wait-for eleven years on average. And what most of them, in reality, are waiting for is not execution, but reversal of their capital judgments because of serious legal error.").
22 erning statute. 24 Conversely, the Court also has devoted considerable attention to the aggravating circumstances that make defendants eligible for the death penalty by requiring that the aggravating circumstances be clearly defined, 25 by prohibiting the consideration of aggravating factors that are not disclosed to the defendant, 26 and by demanding that aggravating circumstances be found by the jury rather than a judge.
27
In addition to dealing with the types of evidence presented to juries, the Court has heavily regulated the process of selecting capital juries. In a series of decisions, the Court tinkered with the standard for removing prospective jurors who are opposed to the death penalty.
28 It also set standards for removing jurors who would never impose the death penalty, 29 and it considered challenges that juries composed of death penalty supporters were inherently biased toward conviction.
30
The Court also has devoted considerable attention to the adequacy of representation received by indigent defendants. In a long series of cases, the Court has attempted to define how much investigation competent counsel are required to undertake to be effective during the sentencing phase of capital trials. 31 It has also While innocence has been a call to arms, Professor David Dow has observed recently-and correctly-that innocence is primarily a distraction from the more prevalent flaws that continue to pervade the death penalty system. 45 Most notable is the continuing problem of racial discrimination in capital punishment. Although the days of white mobs lynching black citizens are long since gone, 46 racial discrimination remains pervasive, and death rows continue to be filled with a disproportionate number of minority offenders. 47 In numerous studies, Professor David Baldus and other scholars have documented the continued widespread racial discrimination in capital sentencing throughout the country. 48 The Court's procedural regulation of the death penalty has done little to reduce the racial discrimination problem over the last thirty years. Indeed, when an equal protection challenge based on Professor Baldus's data reached the Court in 1987, the Court specifically rejected it out-of-hand. 49
Another systematic problem which predates the Gregg decision and which still exists today is the inadequate representation afforded to indigent capital defendants. Although the Supreme 44. See id. at 400 ("Claims of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence have never been held to state a ground for federal habeas relief absent an independent constitutional violation occurring in the underlying state criminal proceeding."). Court has recently imposed slightly more rigorous review on ineffective assistance of counsel claims, 50 few would dispute that poor capital defendants are often represented by appointed lawyers who are unqualified or overworked. 51 Thus, the poor are far more likely to be sentenced to death than those who can afford their own counsel.
52
Another troubling problem continues to be the geographic arbitrariness associated with the imposition of capital punishment. A handful of states produce most of the nation's death sentences, and an even smaller number of states are responsible for most of the actual executions. Between 1973 and 2004, southern states accounted for more than 60% of the nation's death sentences and more than 82% of its executions. 53 Among the southern states, Texas and Virginia accounted for 43% of the nation's executions. 54 By contrast, northeastern states accounted for only about six percent of the country's death sentences and well under one percent of its executions. 55 The disparities, however, are not simply regional. As noted above, there are Texas counties that never seek the death pen- By discussing arbitrariness problems associated with innocence, race, class, and geography, I do not mean to suggest that the judiciary is absent from the supervision of capital punishment. To the contrary, the judiciary exercises vigorous oversight to ensure compliance with the procedural protections laid down by the Supreme Court over the last three decades. Professor James Liebman and his colleagues have found that a staggering sixty-eight percent of capital trials conducted between 1973 and 1995 were reversed on appeal. 59 As Professor Liebman explained, death sentences are "overproduced;" up to six death sentences are handed down for each execution that is actually carried out. 60 Nevertheless, appellate review has not made a dent in the core arbitrariness problems associated with the death penalty: the innocent are still sentenced to death; being poor drastically increases the odds of execution; racial discrimination still pervades the system; and the likelihood of being sentenced to death often depends on which side of the county line the defendant committed his crime. Ultimately, the Court's strict supervision of capital punishment has resulted in petitioners spending tremendous Given that the Court's efforts to reduce the arbitrariness of the death penalty, through procedural regulations and a handful of substantive restrictions, have proved to be a failure, it is time to consider another approach. Because many academics tend to be court-focused, 62 they devote little attention to the prospect of legislatures, rather than the judiciary, imposing restrictions that could improve the functioning of the death penalty.
63
There are a number of ways state legislatures could try to clean up the death penalty mess. States could restrict the number 64 or types 65 of cases that are statutorily eligible for the death penalty, impose a higher burden of proof in capital cases, 66 or provide greater avenues for post-trial review.
67 Yet, while these proposals may have some merit, no state legislatures have taken the bait. Perhaps the explanation for the lack of interest is that the proposals are not politically viable; each might be a political earthquake that would place unpopular obstacles in the way of execu-61. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 3, at 429 (calling the Court's death penalty jurisprudence a "fa~ade" that serves more to make "the public at large more comfortable with the death penalty" than with providing actual protection to defendants).
62. I tend to be guilty of this as well. In a recent article, I suggested that the Court could fix the arbitrariness problem if it would scrap its current jurisprudence and instead cap death penalty prosecutions for each jurisdiction at the national average. See Gershowitz, supra note 12, at 7.
63. See Berman, supra note 5, at 10 (noting that "we now may be able to tum to legislatures to find some hope" for reform).
64. Cf. Gershowitz, supra note 12, at 7 (suggesting that the Supreme Court cap death penalty prosecutions at the national average).
65. See LIEBMAN ET AL., supra note 13, at 394-95 (raising the possibility of limiting the death penalty to crimes of the magnitude of September 11th and the Oklahoma City bombing).
66. tions without creating any immediately noticeable benefits. In place of these less palatable approaches, I offer a more modest proposal: the requirement that prosecutors post a bond before seeking the death penalty.
In most criminal cases, states delegate prosecutorial responsibility to the counties. Thus, it is the county prosecutor who rises in open court to say, "The State is ready to proceed, Your Honor." I do not propose to change that arrangement in capital cases, but simply to have the states impose a monetary restriction on the counties. In recognition of the fact that states often have to shoulder high costs to defend the counties' death sentences on appeal, and that many of those death sentences do not survive on appeal, state legislatures should require county prosecutors to post a bond to cover the states' appellate costs.
The rationale for requiring county prosecutors to post a bond is comparable to the reason society requires criminal defendants to post bond. Judges force defendants to post bond to encourage them to show up for trial. 68 In essence, defendants must post bond because society does not trust them to act properly without the prospect of losing money hanging over their heads. The same logic easily could apply to county prosecutors. If prosecutors want to seek the death penalty, society should not prevent them, but it should create an incentive to guarantee they will behave properly by bringing only meritorious cases and litigating them in a manner that is extremely unlikely to result in reversal on appeal. Below, I offer two types of bond statutes that state legislatures could adopt.
A. The AU-Or-Nothing Approach
The first proposal is what could be called the "ali-or-nothing" approach. In every capital case, county prosecutors could be required to post a bond by. sending a predetermined sum of money to the state treasury. If the defendant is executed, the state would promptly return the entire bond, plus interest, to the county. If the jury refuses to hand down a death sentence, or if the death sentence is reversed on appeal, 69 70. Observers also might contend that forcing small counties to post a large cash bond ex ante would deter them from seeking the death penalty in meritorious cases. There is some risk of this, but examples abound of small counties prosecuting egregious capital cases in the face of huge costs. See Gold, supra note 16; see also infra Part II. C. If high trial costs do not deter counties from seeking the death penalty in the occasional egregious case, the requirement to post an additional cash bond likely would not deter them either. Instead, the proposal is aimed at deterring jurisdictions that seek the death penalty in numerous marginal cases where the cost of posting multiple cash bonds would be a greater deterrent.
71 The ali-or-nothing approach has the virtue of being a fairly simple bright-line rule. Counties would have to decide at the outset whether they believe they will be successful at trial and on appeal. If the prosecutors think there is some risk of an acquittal, a life sentence, or an appellate reversal, then they would have to weigh whether seeking the death penalty is worth the financial risk of losing the bond.
An additional benefit of the ali-or-nothing approach would be to promote truth-in-charging. Today, prosecutors occasionally seek the death penalty in the hopes of encouraging the defendant to plead guilty to a charge carrying a lengthy prison sentence.
75
Critics have long railed against this practice as too heavyhanded, 76 and they have proposed policies encouraging prosecutors to file charges only for those crimes for which they truly believe they can secure convictions.
77 While plea bargaining is likely to remain alive and well in run-of-the-mill criminal cases, imposing a bond requirement in capital cases would greatly restrict the most heavy-handed bargaining.
Relatedly, critics have also asserted that prosecutors who do not actually desire a death sentence sometimes seek the death penalty because a death-qualified jury 78 the defendant of the underlying murder charge. 79 If prosecutors do currently use this tactic, the requirement of posting and possibly forfeiting a bond likely would put an end to it.
In addition to encouraging prosecutors to choose their death penalty cases more carefully and more sparingly, the bond requirement would also encourage prosecutors to try cases with greater caution and to give all close calls to the defendant, so as to avoid a reversal on appeal. Under the current system, prosecutors who procure death sentences are rewarded with good publicity, promotions, and perhaps even with judicial office.
80 By contrast, those same prosecutors suffer little stigma when death sentences are reversed on appeal because many years have gone by (at which point the prosecutor may not even work in the office any longer) and the public's attention has moved on to new death penalty cases. 81 Moreover, when capital cases are reversed, prosecutors often are able to lay the blame on the judiciary rather than the prosecutor's office. Thus, prosecutors who push the envelope at trial to procure a death sentence are rarely called on the carpet to account for appellate reversals.
82
Requiring counties to forfeit a cash bond following reversals likely would stigmatize the prosecutors who handled the case at trial. Following reversal of a death sentence, local newspapers and television stations almost certainly would run stories indicating that the reversal will cost the county a large cash bond plus numerous years of compounded interest. If the costly reversal were to lead to public criticism of the prosecutors who handled 82. See id. at 2127 ("[E]ven in the rare event that there is someone back home who can be, and who is, singled out for a reversal penalty five or ten years after the fact, the penalty comes nowhere near canceling out the amortized rewards from generating the mistaken death sentence in the first place."). To the contrary, prosecutors that cut corners and commit misconduct are sometimes rewarded. See Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Break Rules, Be Promoted, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 14, 1999, at 1 (explaining how prosecutors rebuked by an appellate court were promoted to supervisory positions and later elected judges). UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:861 the case, 83 future capital prosecutors would have a strong incentive not just to win their capital cases, but also to ensure that defendants have the fairest possible trial and have the benefit of all close calls so that there will not be an appellate reversal.
The prospect of forfeiting a large bond also would motivate county prosecutors to advocate improvement of the abysmal state of representation provided to indigent defendants. As Stephen Bright remarked over a decade ago, it is often the defendant with the worst lawyer, rather than the one who committed the worst crime, who receives the death penalty. 84 Yet, under the current system, all that most prosecutors do about the inadequacy of representation is privately lament the problem. 85 County prosecutors have little incentive to push for better representation for defendants because complaining about the lawyers a judge has appointed86 almost certainly would hurt a prosecutor's working re-83. Unfortunately, at present, reversals often do not lead to shaming of the trial prosecutor because courts tend to omit prosecutors' names from their opinions, thus shielding them from embarrassment. See Armstrong & Possley, supra note 82 ("Appellate courts rarely name prosecutors or defense attorneys in their opinions, even when a lawyer is found to have acted abominably."). While this practice is unlikely to change, investigative reporters would have greater incentive to dig up the prosecutors' names when counties have posted a bond because the story could focus not only on the appellate reversal but also the large cash bond the county would forfeit.
84. See Bright, supra note 51, at 1836. 85. Consider the case of Calvin Burdine, whose capital conviction was reversed because his lawyer slept through trial. On remand, the trial judge refused to appoint Burdine's very competent appellate lawyer to handle the retrial. The refusal outraged the local newspaper and prompted a federal judge to order the state trial judge to explain her actions. Yet, the Attorney General's Office did not oppose the judge's actions, saying, "That's between the judge and Mr. Burdine Al. lationship with that judge. 87 While the harm of sticking their necks out is great, the benefit of fighting for better representation for indigent defendants, at present, is minimal; appellate courts infrequently reverse capital convictions based on ineffective assistance of counsel, 88 and even when such reversals occur, it is not the prosecutors who are held responsible.
The prospect of forfeiting a bond could change the current state of affairs and lead prosecutors to advocate better indigent defense representation. If the reversal of any death sentence required the county to forfeit the large bond it posted, and if prosecutors were held politically responsible for the forfeiture, they would have an incentive to ensure that defendants are adequately represented at trial. Thus, prosecutors might not stand by quietly while local judges appoint unqualified cronies, and they might not sit idly while drunk or sleeping lawyers provide terrible representation to defendants during trial. 89 To the contrary, the elected District Attorney (and her subordinates) might advocate for defendants to receive qualified, conscious, and sober counsel before trials begin. Accordingly, if an appointed lawyer's incompetence became apparent during trial, prosecutors could move for a mistrial, rather than face the prospect of a successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim that would lead to forfeiture of the county's bond. elected District Attorney being held politically accountable if the death sentence were reversed could lead prosecutors to be more proactive in seeking quality representation for indigent defendants.
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In adopting the ali-or-nothing approach, the most difficult issue for state legislatures to resolve would be the amount of the bond. As noted, it would make sense for state legislatures to set the bond at the average amount the state spends to protect a death sentence on appeal. Some states may have this figure readily available, but even those without the information could procure it by retaining a statistician or economist to analyze the costs. Once an appropriate amount for the bond is determined, legislatures could draft a statute along the lines set forth here:
a. Preamble 1. Whereas the death penalty is a fitting and appropriate punishment for perpetrators of heinous crimes, and 2. Whereas local prosecutors should retain discretion to determine which cases merit capital prosecutions, and 3. Whereas the costs of imposing the death penalty are substantial, and 4. Whereas the state shoulders all of the appellate costs to ensure that death sentences are in fact carried out, the following procedures shall be required to ensure the death penalty will be applied in a fair, non-arbitrary manner that will be upheld on appeal.
b. Requirement to Post a Bond: In any case in which county prosecutors determine that the death penalty is merited, the county must remit a bond of X dollars to the state treasury before filing capital charges. The bond will be held in an individual interest-bearing account and will accrue interest at the prime rate as published by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. is imposed following trial, and if that death sentence is not reversed or overturned on appeal or in a habeas corpus petition, the full bond amount, plus interest, shall be returned to the county within 30 days following the execution.
d. Consequences of Failed Prosecution:
1. Failed Prosecution or Appeal: Except as provided in sections d(2) and d(3), if the capital prosecution does not result in an execution, the full bond plus all accrued interest will be forfeited to the state.
Commutation:
In the event that the death sentence is commuted by the Governor for reasons other than prosecutorial misconduct, the full bond amount shall be returned to the county, plus interest, within 30 days following the commutation.
A. For purposes of section d(2), prosecutorial misconduct shall be deemed not to have occurred unless the Governor specifically provides in writing that prosecutorial misconduct was a motivating factor for the commutation.
B. In the event there is any dispute between the state and the county about whether the commutation was due to prosecutorial misconduct, the dispute shall be resolved by the Attorney General of the State within 30 days following the commutation.
Death:
In the event that the death-sentenced individual dies prior to the exhaustion of his appeals, the full bond amount, plus interest, shall be returned to the county within 30 days following the prisoner's death.
B. The Graduated Approach
The second proposal is what could be called a "graduated" bond forfeiture. As with the ali-or-nothing approach, counties would be required to post a bond before seeking the death penalty. If the county prosecutors succeeded in procuring a death sentence and preserving the sentence through the appellate process, then the state would return the bond amount, plus interest, to the county following the execution. If the county failed to win a death sen-UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:861 tence or if the sentence were reversed on appeal, then the county would forfeit part of the bond. The amount of the forfeiture would depend on the stage of the process where the death sentence was lost.
For example, if the county sought the death penalty and the jury refused to return a death sentence, the state might provide for the return of 75% of the bond amount, plus the interest accrued on that amount. Returning such a substantial amount of the bond would reflect the fact that the case ended quickly and the state was not forced to expend any money to defend a death sentence on appeal. Such a large refund would signal to prosecutors that they need not abandon the death penalty in all difficult cases because, even if they are unsuccessful some of the time, the county would not lose an overwhelming amount of money. Nevertheless, the risk of losing 25% of the bond amount should deter prosecutors from seeking the death penalty in non-meritorious cases.
Under a graduated approach, the percentage of the bond refunded to the county would diminish as the capital case progressed through the appellate process. Therefore, if a jury handed down a death sentence, and the state were forced to defend that sentence on appeal, the County would forfeit 50% of the bond if the death sentence were reversed during the direct appeal process. If the death sentence were reversed during the collateral postconviction review process (which follows direct appeals), the county would forfeit 75% of the bond amount. Finally, if any court overturned the death sentence due to prosecutorial misconduct, the county would forfeit 100% of the bond amount, regardless of when in the process the reversal occurred.
92
As with the ali-or-nothing approach, a few exceptions would be warranted for the graduated approach. Once again, the county would be entitled to a full refund of the bond, plus interest, if the prisoner's death sentence were commuted for reasons other than prosecutorial misconduct, or if the prisoner died prior to the exhaustion of his appeals. Additionally, the legislature might want to add an exception allowing the county to fully recover the bond, plus interest, if the death sentence were reversed due to a water-92. Sadly, prosecutorial misconduct, primarily in the form of suppressing exculpatory evidence, accounts for almost 20% of reversals at the state and federal postconviction stage. See LIEBMAN ET AL., supra note 13, at 41.
shed change in substantive criminal doctrine.
93 In this respect, if the prosecutor made an error at trial that was simply unforeseeable, then she should not be blamed and the full bond amount should be refunded to the county.
Like the aU-or-nothing approach, the graduated forfeiture would provide counties with an incentive to pursue only the strongest capital cases. If a case looks like a long-shot, the graduated approach would encourage prosecutors not to seek the death penalty at the outset, or at least to plea bargain before trial begins.
The graduated approach also would encourage prosecutors to consider bargaining with the defendant during the appellate or habeas corpus process-a practice that is largely unheard of today. 94 For instance, if the county prevails in the first series of appeals but comes to see its position as weak and fears that the death sentence will not be preserved all the way through the lengthy appellate process, the county might reach a compromise with the defendant whereby a life sentence is imposed. Thus, the state is spared the unnecessary expense of further appeals and the county is allowed to recover a portion of its bond amount.
Finally, a graduated bond forfeiture approach might encourage the revival of the now rare use of executive clemency. Under the current system, governors and pardon boards are reluctant to take responsibility for granting clemency because it is politically unpopular to stop an execution. 95 And if governors do commute a death sentence, they typically do so after millions of dollars have been expended on the lengthy appeals process. 96 Under the 93. This would be a twist on the Supreme Court's retroactivity doctrine under Teague u. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), which ordinarily forbids petitioners from benefiting from new rules of procedure, but makes an exception for "watershed rules of criminal procedure." I d. at 311. Of course, just as it is nearly impossible for a habeas petitioner to prevail under the Teague doctrine, it likewise would be very difficult for a county to prevail either. On the significance and impossibility of surmounting the Teague doctrine, see Stephen F. graduated bond forfeiture approach (as well as the all-or-nothing approach), county governments would have an incentive in weaker cases to lobby the governor to commute death sentences that could possibly be reversed on appeal. In other words, because counties would receive a refund of the entire bond amount, plus interest, if the governor commutes a death sentence, they would have a financial incentive to lobby for commutations if they feared that the death sentence might be reversed on appeal. If counties successfully lobbied to commute death sentences that had a fair chance of being reversed on appeal, the result would be a system where less time and money is devoted to capital appeals because the commutation would eliminate the need for further litigation.
Taking all of these considerations into account, a state legislature interested in the graduated approach could enact legislation modeled on the following draft statute: a. Preamble 1. Whereas the death penalty is a fitting and appropriate punishment for perpetrators of heinous crimes, and 2. Whereas local prosecutors should retain discretion to determine which cases merit capital prosecutions, and 3. Whereas the costs of imposing the death penalty are substantial, and 4. Whereas the state shoulders all of the appellate costs to ensure that death sentences are in fact carried out, the following procedures shall be required to ensure the death penalty will be applied in a fair, non-arbitrary manner that will be upheld on appeal.
b. Requirement to Post a Bond: In any case in which county prosecutors determine that the death penalty is merited, the county must remit a bond of X dollars to the State treasury before filing capital charges. The bond will be held in an individual interest-bearing account and will accrue interest at the prime rate as published by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. awarded by Ohio Governor Richard Celeste at the end of his second term); SARAT, supra note 71, at 1-32 (discussing Governor George Ryan's commutations in Illinois).
c. Recovery of Bond Following Execution: If a death sentence is imposed following trial, and if that death sentence is notreversed or overturned on appeal or in a habeas corpus petition, the full bond amount, plus interest, shall be returned to the county within 30 days following the execution.
d. Consequences of Failed Prosecution: In the event that a capital prosecution does not result in execution, the bond posted by the county shall be returned to the county in the proportions set forth as follows:
1. Prior to Jury Selection: In the event that a county has already posted a bond but states in writing, prior to the beginning of jury selection, that it no longer intends to seek the death penalty, the full bond amount, plus interest, shall be returned to the county within 30 days of the county's written notification.
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6. Prosecutorial Misconduct: In the event of a mistrial or the reversal of a death sentence due to a specific finding of prosecutorial misconduct as specified in section d(6)(A), the county shall forfeit the full bond amount, plus all accrued interest.
A Prosecutorial misconduct shall include the failure to turn over exculpatory evidence as required by Brady v. Maryland, 373 U .S. 83 (1963) , the unlawful exercise of peremptory challenges based on race or gender, suborning perjury, knowingly using false testimony, coercing witnesses, or fabricating evidence.
B. In the event there is any dispute between the county and the state as to whether the reversal of a death sentence was due to prosecutorial misconduct, the dispute shall be resolved by the Attorney General of the State within 30 days following the termination of the appeals process.
7. Commutation: In the event that the death sentence is commuted by the Governor for reasons other than prosecutorial misconduct as specified in section d(7)(A), the full bond amount shall be returned to the county, with interest, within 30 days following the commutation.
A For purposes of section d(7) only, prosecutorial misconduct shall be presumed not to have occurred unless the Governor specifically states in writing that prosecutorial misconduct was a motivating factor for the commutation.
B. In the event there is any ambiguity about whether the commutation was due to prosecutorial misconduct, the dispute shall be resolved by the Attorney General of the State within 30 days following the commutation. 8. Death: In the event that the death-sentenced individual dies prior to the exhaustion of his appeals, the full bond amount, plus interest, shall be returned to the county within 30 days following the prisoner's death.
C. Solving the Small County Problem
The purpose of forcing county prosecutors to post a bond prior to seeking the death penalty is to change the behavior of mediumand large-sized counties that overproduce death sentences. The goal is to make them face the full financial consequences of their decisions and to deter them from seeking the death penalty in marginal cases. The proposal is not intended to deter the use of capital punishment in appropriate cases. Yet, critics could argue that the proposal would place an impossible financial burden on small counties, thus making the death penalty so expensive that only wealthy counties could utilize it.
97 While I share this concern, I offer two reasons why it is not particularly worrisome.
First, it is already rare for small counties to seek the death penalty because they are unwilling to shoulder the tremendous pretrial and trial costs of capital cases.
98 And when truly egregious cases do come along, small counties are sometimes willing to seek the death penalty, even knowing full well that it will cause serious financial problems for the county. 99 41:861 that seeking the death penalty would be a financial crunch for the small county of about 35,000 people, 101 they charged three defendants with capital murder and spent more than $1 million seeking the death penalty.
102 Indeed, the county actually raised property taxes to pay for the trial.
103 If prosecutors felt so strongly that the death penalty outweighed the huge financial costs, it is unlikely that they would have been deterred by the additional costs of posting a bond. 104 Second, when a truly heinous case arises, counties that are financially unable to post a bond to seek the death penalty could apply to the state government for supplemental funding. On occasion, state governments provide counties with discretionary funds to assist with the unusually high costs of certain criminal cases. 105 Consider the example of another small Texas jurisdiction, Polk County, which has a population of 46,000.
106 Polk County has been trying for decades to execute John Paul Penry for a brutal rape and murder. 107 Due to Supreme Court rulings, Penry has been granted two retrials, which have cost Polk County exorbitant sums of money. To help defray the costs of the third trial, the State of Texas provided Polk County with $100,000.
108
If states are occasionally willing to assist small counties with the hefty trial costs of capital cases, they also likely would help small counties to post bonds in unusually egregious cases. Of course, this scenario carries the risk of the exception swallowing the rule. The purpose of requiring counties to post (and possibly forfeit) a cash bond to seek the death penalty is to force them to internalize the steep financial costs of unsuccessful death penalty appeals. If counties are regularly permitted to use state money to post the bonds, then they will not internalize those costs and will be unlikely to change their behavior.
While this scenario is problematic, it would be unlikely to occur very often. States have only a relatively small amount of discretionary money to assist counties with capital cases. 109 And while state legislatures might be convinced to assist a small (or even a large) county with the costs of posting a bond in a James Byrdtype case, legislatures likely would be unwilling to provide ex ante funding for multiple such cases in a given year.
Ill. INCENTIVES FOR STATE LEGISLATURES
The final significant question to address is whether state legislatures would have any interest in requiring counties to post and risk forfeiting a bond to seek the death penalty. There are two reasons why the answer might be yes. First, the available data indicates that states spend large sums of money to defend counties' death penalty verdicts on appeal. In recent years, there are increasing examples of states bucking the "tough on crime" trend to reduce corrections spending in favor of funding other budget priorities. Second, legislators from smaller counties that rarely use the death penalty have an added incentive to require a bond in capital cases because they are currently spending their tax dollars to subsidize the capital appeals of larger counties.
109. See, e.g ., WASH. STATE BAR Ass'N, supra note 98, at 33 (explaining that Washington State's Extraordinary Criminal Justice Costs Act of 1999, which provides state funding to counties, "has not been fully funded and its funding has steadily declined").
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A. Appeals Are the Most Expensive Aspect of Capital Cases
A number of studies have found capital punishment to be a more expensive process than life imprisonment. For instance, a North Carolina study estimated the costs of an execution to be $2.16 million more than the cost of imprisoning an individual for life. 110 A Texas study conducted in the early 1990s estimated that the death penalty cost $2.3 million per case prosecuted in the state, about three times the cost of imprisoning someone for forty years. m Commentators have estimated that large states such as California and Florida could save tens of millions of dollars per year by eliminating capital punishment. 112 Significantly, the bulk of the costs associated with capital cases are not the trials themselves, but the appeals. 113 Because of complicated rules and multiple stages of review in capital cases, appellate costs are far greater than costs in non-capital cases. 114 For instance, a 2003 study of Kansas found that the appellate costs associated with death penalty cases were more than twenty times the costs in non-capital cases. 115 A North Carolina study found the appellate and postconviction costs in capital cases to be about PAY NOW, EXECUTE LATER 891 four times as great as trial costs. 116 A capital defense lawyer in California explained over a decade ago that each death penalty case costs between $3.5 and $4.5 million in postconviction costs, far in excess of the $1 to $1.2 million in trial costs. 117 More interesting than the sheer size of appellate and postconviction costs is who pays for them. Typically, it is states that spend millions of dollars to defend counties' death penalty verdicts following trial. 118 In most instances, it is the state attorney general's office, rather than county prosecutors, which handle appeals and habeas corpus petitions in capital cases. 119 In addition, many states provide lawyers for indigent defendants on appeal and state postconviction review, something that is not provided in non-capital cases. 120 In addition to attorney time, the state typically pays for court costs associated with death penalty cases. 121 A recent study of fourteen Kansas death-penalty cases found that the state paid more than $3 million in appellate related costs, compared with less than $100,000 paid by the counties. 122 State legislators may soon grow weary of paying high appellate costs for death penalty verdicts that often are reversed on appeal. And legislators also might wish to shift those costs to county budgets. Consider the slowly emerging trend in non-capital expenditures. During the 1990s, state spending on corrections doubled from $17 billion to $35 billion. 123 But as prison costs have skyrocketed, some legislators have begun to express concerns about having enough funding for other public needs, such as health care, education, and law enforcement. 124 Although it is still popular to be "tough on crime," some states recently have taken steps toward reducing their corrections costs. 125 Examples abound of legislators emphasizing fiscal concerns in their newfound support for reduced sentencing. A Michigan legislator noted that when he first introduced bills to reduce mandatory minimum sentences, he received little support. After a conference on the state budget, however, the governor called him "to see how we can make these bills happen." Kansas's decision to require treatment instead of incarceration for first-time, nonviolent drug offenders rested in part on the fact that "those people who favor being tough on crime don't want to find the money to build more prisons." Washington passed its drug treatment diversion programs, according to one expert, because "[t]he fiscal crisis has brought together the folks who think sentences are too long with the folks who are perfectly happy with the sentences but think prison is costing too much." One Texas state representative supported treatment options for drug offenders because it was cost effective and would free prison space for more violent offenders. Several governors have ordered the early release of prisoners with the explicit goal of reducing correctional costs and addressing budget crises.
130
Although most of the movement to restore fiscal discipline has focused on reducing incarceration costs, the same logic should apply with even greater force to the use of the death penalty, particularly since there has been a small decline in the popularity of the death penalty 131 and a substantial decline in the number of death sentences in recent years. 132 Because capital cases are so expensive, and because so few of them actually end in executions, the system is ripe for reforms that impose greater fiscal discipline. 133 Money saved on exorbitant capital appeals is money the states could spend on other projects. Indeed, a head count of Texas counties finds that only seven of Texas's 254 counties sent more than twenty defendants to death row over the last thirty years. 140 The remaining 24 7 counties procured death sentences, on average, well less than once per year. To be sure, the seven Texas counties 141 that frequently use the death penalty are large jurisdictions and hold a substantial number of seats in the state legislature. But even if we were to count every Texas legislator who represents any portion of those seven counties, they would still account for only sixty-seven of the 150 seats in the Texas House of Representatives.
142 Moreover, many of those sixty-seven legislative districts are in predominantly minority sections of large cities-constituencies that tend to oppose the use of the death penalty.
143
While the political calculus is surely more complicated than simply conducting a head-count, the reality is that well over half the legislative districts in Texas have a fiscal incentive to require counties to post a bond and pay for the costs of failed capital prosecutions. The same logic likely applies in many other states where only a handful of counties actively use the death penalty.
IV. CONCLUSION
At present, county prosecutors are free to seek the death penalty as they see fit, but they typically do not have to fund the very expensive appellate and postconviction stages of capital cases. Accordingly, when death sentences are reversed-and many of them are reversed for prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective assis- tance of counsel, and other reasons-county prosecutors are not forced to fully internalize the costs of their failed prosecutions. State legislatures can provide a better incentive structure for local prosecutors by requiring counties to post a bond before seeking the death penalty. Faced with the prospect of losing the bond if the defendant is not sentenced to death or if the death sentence is reversed on appeal, prosecutors would have an incentive to choose their capital cases carefully and to avoid any type of misconduct that might lead to reversal on appeal. Additionally, the prospect of forfeiting a bond likely would create secondary benefits, such as encouraging prosecutors to protest the appointment of unqualified defense lawyers who might give rise to colorable ineffective assistance of counsel claims. As a financial matter, the bond proposal should be appealing to state legislators because it would shift the costs of failed capital prosecutions away from state budgets and into the hands of the county actors who instigated the failed prosecutions. In addition, the bond proposal should be particularly appealing to legislators from small counties because it re-directs some of the high appellate and postconviction costs away from small counties that never use the death penalty to large jurisdictions that frequently seek capital punishment.
